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How Long before 
Recertifying Medicaid 
and CHIP Children? 
Income-based eligibility recertification 
is an essential component in virtually 
all means-tested social programs in the 
United States. It exists to ensure that 
the benefit is targeted at the neediest 
individuals or families. In many studies 
that examine the effect of means-tested 
programs on labor supply, an implicit 
assumption is that program eligibility 
is constantly monitored. However, 
many of these programs do not operate 
this way, and the time between two 
consecutive eligibility certifications, or 
the “recertification period,” can be as 
long as a year. Although this policy lever 
is recognized and its effect on program 
participation is explored in several studies 
of transfer programs (e.g., Currie and 
Grogger 2001; Kabbani and Wilde 2003; 
Prell 2008; and Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu 
2008), a formal theoretical and empirical 
investigation has not been carried out to 
address how program participants may 
respond to the incentives resulting from 
the lack of constant income monitoring. 
In my research, I attempt to fill this 
gap by examining families’ behavioral 
responses to the continuous eligibility 
provision for children participating in 
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP, or simply 
CHIP). The analysis of income and labor 
supply responses is key in answering 
the important policy question of how 
often eligibility monitoring should be 
conducted.
Uninterrupted eligibility monitoring 
ensures that an income-tested program is 
effectively targeting the needy. However, 
if monitoring is costly and incomes 
of program participants change little 
over time, it may be sensible for the 
government to decrease the frequency 
of eligibility checks and offer a period 
of “continuous eligibility.” Granting 
continuous eligibility increases the value 
of a transfer program to its participants in 
two ways. First, less frequent monitoring 
reduces transaction costs associated with 
gathering eligibility materials and visiting 
caseworkers for program beneficiaries. 
Second, continuous eligibility provisions 
allow families to be less constrained in 
their labor supply decisions. That is, once 
households qualify for an income-tested 
program for a specified period, they will 
not be disqualified even if their incomes 
exceed the maximum income threshold, 
allowing them to work the desired 
amount while retaining their benefits. 
However, the provisions increase the 
possibility for less needy households 
to lower their incomes temporarily in 
order to qualify for the program, and 
then revert to their usual incomes while 
enjoying the benefits. 
Because the families that behave 
strategically are not the intended 
beneficiaries of the program, setting the 
continuous eligibility period involves 
the trade-off between minimizing the 
number of such families and reducing 
the economic loss associated with 
monitoring. As mentioned above, the loss 
includes the administrative costs to the 
government, pecuniary and time costs 
of families participating in the program, 
and the deprivation of program benefits 
for some of the families most in need 
when the transaction costs of eligibility 
recertifications become insurmountable. 
Olson, Tang, and Newacheck (2005) 
show that children who experience 
interruptions in health insurance coverage 
are more likely to have unmet health care 
needs; therefore, imposing bureaucratic 
burden on otherwise eligible families 
may reduce targeting efficiency as well. 
Given these trade-offs, understanding 
the behavioral response to the lack of 
eligibility monitoring has important 
policy implications. The recertification 
period may be too long if we find 
evidence of families strategically and 
temporarily lowering their incomes in 
order to gain program eligibility. If no 
strategic behavior is found, however, it 
may be beneficial to lengthen the period 
of eligibility. 
Income and Labor Supply Responses
I carry out an empirical investigation 
of the labor supply effect of the 
continuous eligibility provisions in the 
context of Medicaid/CHIP and provide 
a framework to compute the optimal 
eligibility recertification frequency. 
Along with creating the SCHIP program, 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 gives 
states the option to continuously insure 
children for up to 12 months in their 
public insurance programs regardless of 
changes in family income during that 
period. A third of the states implemented 
the continuous eligibility option in their 
public insurance program for children. 
These states present an opportunity 
to gauge the significance of the 
aforementioned strategic behavior, which 
then sheds light on the choice of the 
optimal continuous eligibility period. 
Using the 2001 and 2004 panels 
of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation, I follow an event-study 
framework and trace out families’ 
incomes as their children enrolled in 
Medicaid/CHIP. Figure 1 plots the 
movement of average family incomes 
over the 48 months around the beginning 
of a public insurance spell. 
Neither of the panels shows a 
pronounced dip-and-rebound in income 
in the six months before and after the 
spell start. For the 2001 panel, the income 
trend leading up to the beginning of the 
public insurance spell is practically flat; 
the average income increases gradually 
during the spell especially after 12 
months, but the period immediately 
Continuous eligibility 
provisions allow families to 
be less constrained in their 
labor supply decisions.
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following the spell start shows no 
rebound. In the 2004 panel, the income 
process shows a persistent downward 
trend throughout the four-year window 
without a visible rebound. 
Even though the strategic behavior 
predicted by the labor supply model is 
not salient in Figure 1, certain subgroups 
may be expected to exhibit stronger 
responses than others. Examining these 
subgroups separately may help to isolate 
the effects that are otherwise masked in 
the full sample. Among others, I select 
several subsamples in which families 
may adjust their labor supply more easily 
(two-parent families), be more likely to 
understand program rules (at least one 
parent is college educated), or face a 
stronger incentive to behave strategically 
(families with more children). The 
subsample analyses reveal income trends 
similar to those in the full sample and are 
not indicative of strategic behavior. 
Testing Model Predictions
Because of the relatively small 
sample size, I cannot strictly rule out 
a small income rebound in several of 
my samples. Therefore, I calibrate the 
expected income rebound magnitude 
based on a standard economic model 
and compare it to the actual rebound 
magnitude. In all subsamples, the actual 
rebound magnitude is smaller than 
the model-predicted magnitude, and 
the model prediction is rejected with 
confidence. 
Comparisons of income processes 
between counterfactual groups are 
also carried out to address the issues 
of unaccounted income trends over a 
Medicaid/CHIP spell, concentration of 
strategic behavior in only a subset of 
the families, as well as possible model 
misspecification in the calibration 
exercise. I compare the income processes 
between high- and low-income families 
and families in states that did and did 
not provide 12 months of continuous 
eligibility to simultaneously address 
all three of those issues. High-income 
families and those living in states 
providing 12-month continuous eligibility 
are expected to exhibit stronger strategic 
behavior than their counterparts, but the 
counterfactual analysis does not reveal 
the rebound magnitude to be statistically 
significant between the different groups. 
Again, the result provides no evidence 
indicative of the strategic behavior as 
predicted by a standard economic model. 
Optimal Length of the Continuous 
Eligibility Period
With strategic behavior practically 
ruled out, I explore the following policy 
question: What is the right recertification 
frequency for families participating in 
Medicaid/CHIP? The two key factors 
in answering the question are 1) the 
volatility of the income process, and  
2) the costs associated with recertification. 
Intuitively, if income does not change 
at all over time, then the government 
only needs to check income once to 
identify the needy population. But if 
there is a lot of movement across the 
public insurance eligibility cutoff, more 
frequent recertifications may be called 
for, which will remove families from the 
program when they no longer need the 
benefits. The need to monitor income 
must then be weighed against the cost of 
eligibility recertification, which should 
be conducted less frequently if the 
cost of the verification process is high 
for the government or for the program 
participants. 
Using a simple economic 
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Figure 1  Average Family Income by Month in Public Insurance Spell
Panel A: 2001 SIPP
Panel B: 2004 SIPP
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monitoring frequency under various 
assumptions regarding social welfare 
and recertification costs. The calculation 
suggests that 12 months may serve as a 
lower bound on the length of the optimal 
continuous eligibility period. That 
said, with technological advancement 
and improved data sharing among 
government agencies, recertification costs 
may decrease significantly in the future, 
in which case the continuous eligibility 
period can be shortened to improve 
targeting efficiency. 
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